Germany has become the strongest voice for a tougher European stance against China, marking a significant departure from decades of economic pragmatism that prioritised bilateral trade ties over geopolitical confrontation. New research from the European Council on Foreign Relations reveals that 49 per cent of Germans now regard China as fundamentally a rival or adversary—a proportion substantially higher than any other major European nation surveyed. This hardening of public sentiment reflects the tangible economic consequences that German workers and industrial sectors have endured, providing political cover for policymakers previously hesitant to embrace confrontational trade measures.
The contrast with other European populations underscores Germany's unique exposure to Chinese competition. France trails at 43 per cent viewing China adversarially, while Spain and Bulgaria are far more positive about Beijing, with 65 and 62 per cent respectively seeing the country as a cooperative partner or ally. Only 38 per cent of Germans hold favourable views of China in any form, a striking reversal from the post-reunification narrative of economic interdependence that long dominated German policy circles. This shift suggests that public tolerance for the costs of engagement with Beijing has evaporated among ordinary Germans confronting employment insecurity.
The material foundation for this attitudinal change lies in stark employment data that has captured policymakers' attention in Berlin and Brussels alike. Germany's manufacturing sector has shed approximately 420,000 jobs between 2019 and 2025, with the bleeding continuing at a rate of roughly 10,000 positions monthly. The automotive industry, historically the engine of German economic strength and employment, faces particularly acute pressure as Chinese manufacturers displace traditional competitors in both domestic and international markets. This structural transformation represents not merely cyclical economic slowdown but a fundamental reordering of global automotive competition, with implications extending far beyond Germany into the entire European supply chain.
The German government has nonetheless maintained caution on new restrictive measures, earning a reputation as a holdout within the European Union's decision-making framework. During 2024 negotiations over anti-subsidy duties targeting Chinese-made electric vehicles, Berlin notably resisted alongside other member states while the broader EU bloc moved toward implementation. This reluctance stemmed partly from internal coalition tensions, particularly with Economy Minister Katherina Reiche, herself from Chancellor Friedrich Merz's Christian Democratic Union, proving most resistant to escalatory China policy. Such divisions reflect the competing interests within German industrial and financial circles, where some sectors remain deeply embedded in Chinese supply chains and markets.
Yet the political risk calculus appears to be shifting as public opinion crystallises around China as a genuine economic threat. The think tank's analysis notes that upwards of 60 per cent of supporters of both the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats—Germany's two largest mainstream parties—now classify China as an adversary or rival. This cross-party consensus suggests that Berlin faces minimal domestic political penalty for adopting a more assertive trade posture, potentially unlocking policy options previously constrained by fears of electoral backlash. The research effectively demolishes arguments that hawkish China policies lack public legitimacy.
An intriguing fault line emerges at the ideological extremes of the German political spectrum, where attitudes toward China diverge sharply from the centre-right and centre-left mainstream. The far-right Alternative for Germany, which commands substantial polling strength and could influence outcomes in provisional state elections, demonstrates notably more positive sentiment toward Beijing, with 45 per cent calling China a necessary partner. Similarly, the Left party expresses more collaborative inclinations. This positioning potentially reflects these parties' scepticism toward traditional Atlantic alignments and their greater willingness to pursue multipolar foreign policy frameworks, though it sits awkwardly with the AfD's nationalist rhetoric in other policy domains.
Within mainstream parties, the Social Democrats have emerged as unexpectedly assertive voices on China, with 60 per cent of their supporters viewing the country through an adversarial lens. This represents a departure from social democratic parties' historical inclination toward more conciliatory approaches to Beijing at the European level, suggesting that economic pain may be reshaping ideological commitments around trade protectionism. The shift underscores how material conditions—rather than geopolitical doctrine alone—are driving European recalibration of China policy across the political spectrum.
Crucially, even German business leadership is abandoning the consensus of non-engagement that characterised the previous era. Volkswagen's chief executive recently advocated publicly for European Commission tariffs on Chinese plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and endorsed the very protective duties he had previously opposed with vigour during 2024 negotiations. This represents the first occasion on which a leader of one of Germany's three automotive giants has openly called for trade defence measures against Chinese competition. Such a statement carries outsized significance within German political culture, where industrial lobbying traditionally exerts decisive influence on government policy formation.
This corporate pivot signals that the threat environment has crossed a psychological threshold beyond which the traditional German business playbook—quiet advocacy to Berlin and Brussels for inaction—no longer functions as a viable strategy. When companies previously comfortable with market exposure conclude that competitive dynamics have become structurally adverse, political resistance to protective measures collapses remarkably rapidly. The Chinese challenge has apparently become so acute that even actors historically committed to open trade prefer regulatory countermeasures to continued exposure to displacement and market loss.
For Southeast Asian economies closely integrated into both German and Chinese supply networks, these developments carry substantial implications. Any major German or European policy reorientation toward China will reverberate through regional value chains that depend on access to German technology, automotive components, and investment capital. Malaysian and other regional manufacturers positioned as alternative production sites to China may find themselves competitors for European capital and markets, with potential advantages flowing to nations perceived as more strategically aligned with Western trade interests. The nascent German hawkishness thus represents not merely a bilateral German-Chinese matter but a broader reconfiguration of economic geography with consequences extending throughout Asia.
The transformation of German public and elite opinion on China reflects a hard-won recognition that economic integration alone cannot prevent structural displacement when technological capabilities and factor costs favour rival producers. This lesson carries resonance across developed economies grappling with manufacturing decline and industrial competitiveness. Berlin's journey from accommodation toward assertiveness suggests that persistent employment losses and sectoral displacement will eventually overwhelm diplomatic courtesies and commercial interests, fundamentally reorienting how major industrial powers approach engagement with rising economic competitors.
